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The Role of Governance in the Cultivation of University as an Ethical
Enterprise
Dr. Thomas B. McMorrow
University of Ontario Institute of Technology
Abstract
Universities have always relied on financial and other resources to pursue their goals. Over
the last two decades, the percentage of financial support they receive from government has
dwindled (Metcalfe, 2010). The expression, “enterprising university”, is generally used to refer
to post- secondary educational institutions adopting entrepreneurial approaches to locate new
sources and forms of revenue. Invoking the term in a normative register, some adopt a
cheerful, triumphant tone (Meyer, 2002), others a gloomy, foreboding one (Lynch, 2006).
Certain opponents condemn the “enterprising university” for spelling the end of university as
we know it, whereas certain proponents claim being “enterprising” offers universities their last,
best chance of survival. I support the characterization of university as an enterprise, but I do
not think it should be framed exclusively (or even primarily) as an economic one.
Etymologically, the word ‘enterprise’ means ‘undertaking’— that is, an endeavour, an activity,
a project through time. This is an apt description of university whose survival and flourishing
ultimately rely on the commitment of its members. I argue that framing university as an ethical
undertaking informs while being informed by the following considerations: first, the integrity of
university as an enterprise; second, the most suitable basis for evaluating the endeavour;
third, the purposes of the enterprise; fourth, how the undertaking is governed, and lastly, who
we imagine its undertakers to be. In this paper, I examine each subject in turn. My goal is to
demonstrate why the university ought to be imagined foremost as an ethical enterprise— a
shared project of teaching, learning and discovery, fostering each individual’s pursuit of virtue.

The Idea of a University and the Principle of Integrity
It is fitting that this symposium on Higher Education in Transformation would
be held in Dublin, Ireland. After all, it was in this city, over one hundred and
sixty years ago, that John Henry Newman delivered his lectures to the
founding members of Ireland’s first Catholic university. The collection of those
discourses bears the title, The Idea of a University (1852/1996). It is notable,
as Margaret Thornton observes, that “a work produced for the gendered,
elitist, colonial and Catholic Ireland of 150 years ago” strikes such a chord
with “contemporary postcolonial, egalitarian and secular humanists wrestling
with mass education” (Thornton, 2004, p. 491). She suggests this is because
Newman was on to something when he stressed the love of knowledge for its
own sake as fundamental to the idea of a university.
Of course, Newman was writing in a particular place and time, so it would be
unwise to simply transpose his idea of a university whole cloth to the
contemporary context. For example, no longer does the division of intellectual
labour between academies and universities that existed during the mid-19th
exist today. Nevertheless, recognizing a conceptual distinction between
teaching and discovery—the sharing and the pursuit of knowledge— presents
their relationship as one of interactive complementarity, rather than static
identity. When they are seen to serve an intellectual purpose, the discovery
and teaching of knowledge appear to operate symbiotically. It was Newman’s
characterization of the university’s object as an intellectual one that was
crucial to his whole argument. For Newman and his audience, it went without
saying that faith in God and his church offers the heavy duty spiritual
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machinery necessary to fulfill the Herculean task of overcoming man’s (sic)
fallen nature (p. 90). By affirming that knowledge is one thing and virtue
another, Newman is able to do two things: first, trace the limits to pursuing
knowledge in such a way that underscores its ephemeral character in contrast
to the supernatural concerns of the Church; and second, demarcate that form
of human endeavour that a university is uniquely competent to foster.
Newman shows that the activity of cultivating the mind has its own integrity (p.
7). Accordingly, there must be freedom to pursue that purpose unencumbered
by external interference, no matter how well-intentioned or valuable in its own
right that outside influence is. Newman acknowledged the authority of the
Roman Catholic Church on issues of morality but insisted that the object of a
university was “an intellectual not a moral one” (p. 3). In this way he sought to
reconcile the institution’s Catholic character with its identity as a university.
There is an important lesson to be drawn from Newman’s approach to
conceiving a “Catholic university”, when imagining an “enterprising” university.
As profound a role as religious belief would have had for Newman and his cofounders when it came to justifying decisions about their university, now
market-based logic has just as strong an influence on the way every
dimension of university is theorized and practiced. The lesson for us today,
then, is this: Failure to appreciate the purpose of the institution risks
compromising its integrity and resulting in a “university” unworthy of the name.
This does not mean retreating from the marketplace and rejecting the label of
“the enterprising university” out of hand. After all, as Marginson & Considine
(2001) wrote over a decade ago, “We live in the age of business and it is plain
to everyone that the money-changers have long since mortgaged the temple
(p. 2).” The real question is not whether a university should be enterprising,
but what kind of enterprise it should be.
The Blind-Spots of a Purely Economic Perspective
Even before the dawning of the age of “academic capitalism” (Slaughter &
Leslie, 1997) universities could be seen in competition with one another—for
students, faculty, research funding and recognition. The precipitous decline in
government funding and concomitant rise in resource-seeking behaviour
made the sense of competition within third-level education that much more
acute. The mobility of students and professors, plus the number of creditgranting institutions had already been increasing; the advent of online learning
platforms has signalled the latest, most dramatic jump in these trends (Mirlees
& Alvi 2014).
Moreover, as the amount of money that government agencies were charged
with distributing shrank, decisions were made to make markets the primary
allocative mechanism by which such funding would be doled out. Its
commercial value and/or monetization potential became the chief criteria by
which to judge the kinds of research projects meriting public investment.
Thus, the conditions continued to ripen for market-based logic to drive
university policy. After all, no university wants the 21st century third-level
education marketplace to leave it locked out on the wrong side of the door.
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Markets are arenas of exchange and therefore represent a certain type of
allocative mechanism. The desire (indeed the need) to exchange is so
fundamental to the condition of human beings that it provides a basic principle
of human association (Fuller, 1969, p.90). But not all forms of human
association are exclusively or even primarily transactional in character. While
there’s no question an economic lens can be brought to bear on any form of
human interaction, it can only reveal that which is fungible. Thus, where
goods are non-fungible, markets cannot function as allocative mechanisms.
To entrust all decision-making to market-based logic is to forfeit the allocation
of intangible goods. Because markets function by assimilating all goods into
their use- value, the inassimilable are either squeezed out or made to fit in a
distorted form. Quantifiability comes to substitute for quality.
The mode of reasoning associated with market analysis is consequentialism.
As the word suggests, consequentialism is all about results. Everyone adopts
consequentialist reasoning some of the time. It would be utterly foolish not to.
Understandably, a point of view trained on the maximization of efficiency or
enhancement of utility has a great deal of currency in third-level education. An
economic perspective can reveal a lot, but it also has a considerable blind
spot, since from this point of view, there is no such thing as quality
independent of exchange value. Failing to correctly identify what a practice is
good for, however, can lead to it being used for things for which it is not
particularly well suited; for example, there are some very good reasons to
recommend detailed study of the Bible; understanding the scientific evidence
informing the theory of evolution is not one of them.
The problem with adopting market-based logic arises when it is treated as the
sole way of thinking about how to act. Given how thoroughly instrumentalist
such thinking is, it makes it impossible to grasp the value of any human goal
or activity for its own sake. In the last section of this paper, I argued that the
real question before us is not whether a university should be enterprising, but
what kind of enterprise it should be. Another way to put the question is this:
what does it profit a university to have great enrollment numbers, full coffers,
and highly esteemed faculty members, if the quest for prestige overwhelms all
aspiration to virtue? To the extent that, as a human value, the aspiration to
virtue withstands mathematical computation, market analysis is insensible to
it. For this reason, an instrumentalist way of thinking about integrity will forever
stalk around the conceptual edges of its meaning.
When it comes capturing the meaning of the principle of integrity (either for
individuals or institutions), the limited purchase of market analysis is most
dramatically displayed by efforts to quantify the reputational benefits that
accrue to having integrity. And no doubt, attempts along these lines to
quantify the value of integrity are instrumental in demonstrating its utility; they
are useless, however, when use-value is not the only thing one wants to
show.
University decision-makers who resist total enthralment to market-based logic
may chance their arm on the possibility that the underpinning assumption of
economic analysis-- that market actors make all of their decisions according to
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self-interest— is actually not true. Or, that because all individual market
actors are subject to bounded rationality, a good number will not act the way
economic analysis dictates that they are supposed to. Or, finally, that doing
things for what are felt to be the right reasons may yield longer term economic
benefits. After all it wasn’t John Harvard’s branding strategy that led to the
record sales that t-shirts bearing his college’s name have enjoyed. Choices
informed by a vision of the university’s intellectual object may also end up
yielding competitive advantages.
The training to perform a finite set of tasks pales in comparison to an
education in the pursuit of lifelong learning. The more adaptable one is, the
greater one’s potential contribution within a given work environment will be—
and the more competitive one will be in an ever-changing job market. The rate
of technological change is such that if students emerge from university with
mastery over the use of the latest technology—but that’s it—it won’t be long
before their know- how becomes irrelevant. In this section I have been
seeking to show the limitations of economic analysis as a way of looking at
the world and a basis for making decisions about what one should or should
not do. I have not denied the existence of markets or even the desirability of
market- based logic. I have just sought to highlight that on both scores, they
are contingent, not absolute 2.
The higher the quality of graduates—the more sharply honed their intellectual
skills—the more credit redounds to the university. Metaphorically speaking,
intellectual ability is the most fungible asset in a knowledge-based economy.
But its potential contribution to market competitiveness only partially accounts
for its value. An economic explanation cannot do justice to the meaning of an
education—how it contributes to one’s experience of the world, one’s
development of an inner life of the mind and of the heart.
That market analysis is insensible to virtue does not make it bad. The defects
of this particular intellectual lens arise from its manner of use by the viewer
who either claims whatever cannot be seen in this way is not there or deploys
the lens itself in a short-sighted manner. It is heady business trying to predict
relations of supply and demand over time. Focusing on the immediate,
however, will mean that one’s diagnosis and prescription end up obsolete very
near after they are made. If one is going to look at benefits of university
education for students, one should take the long-term view. Of course, as
economist John Maynard Keynes once noted, “[i]n the long-run we are all
dead” (Keynes 1923). When thinking about the kind of education universities
should offer to their students, the implications of what may seem a rather glib
remark nonetheless warrant serious attention.
The End or Ends of University as an Enterprise?
2

Markets depend on a given set of institutions to make them viable. The patron saint of neoliberalism himself, Friedrich Hayek, acknowledged the establishment of legal concepts, rules
and institutions regarding property, contract, adjudication, policing etc., as precursors to a
“free” market (Hayek, 2013). It makes it difficult, then, to characterize the emergence of
markets as “spontaneous” when it appears to depend on an accumulation of deliberate acts
(Fuller, 1955, p. 1322)

PAGE | 58

HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSFORMATION – DUBLIN 2015

There is a scene in the novel, Stoner, where the eponymous protagonist finds
himself completely tongue-tied in response to his professor’s question about
the meaning of a particular Shakespearean sonnet (Williams 2003). What may
appear on its face to be an unremarkable (albeit regrettably all too
commonplace) occurrence turns out to be a transformative event for the
student. As if confronting his own ignorance, his own unknowing, for the first
time, William Stoner experiences a kind of revelation. He never articulates
what has changed inside of him but he does end up deciding to switch out of
agricultural science and pursue a degree in English instead. He proceeds to
do graduate work and ends up as a professor of English at the very university
in which his love of the subject began.
Following his anatomy of this scene, reviewer Julian Barnes notes:
Many [readers] will be reminded of their own lectoral epiphanies, of
those moments when the magic of literature first made some kind of
distant sense, first suggested that this might be the best way of
understanding life. And readers are also aware that this sacred inner
space, in which reading and ruminating and being oneself happen, is
increasingly threatened by what Stoner refers to as ‘the world’ – which
is nowadays full of hectic interference with, and constant surveillance
of, the individual (Barnes 2013).
Such a moment of discovery is what many university teachers hope will
happen for each of their students. To feel a connection to the subject, to feel
personally implicated in its study—that’s the idea of what it means to be a
student, is it not? The sense of wonder, the pure joy that attends the act of
learning—this is the experience that unites the researcher, the teacher, and
the student. What Barnes calls “this sacred inner space, in which reading and
ruminating and being oneself happen” speaks at once to the very heart of
intellectual activity and the sanctum we hope university will provide for this at
once shared and personal endeavour. It is lamentable, if albeit predictable,
that in an age of rampant consumerist individualism, it is also uncouth to
speak of the human soul. But what better metaphor is there in the English
language to describe, in the deepest sense, who we are? Without such a
conceptual marker, care of the self is blurred with egoism, freedom with
license, and responsibility with absolute control. Every prescription of a ‘how’
is predicated on some idea of a ‘why’, rooted in a belief about what is good.
Hence W.E.B. Du Bois’ declaration that “the object of all true education is not
to make men carpenters, it is to make carpenters men” (Du Bois, 1903, p. 63).
In other words, I would say: no matter the discipline, trade or profession, the
educational component does not simply lie in the explicit instruction of what to
do; rather, it is bound up in the implicit invitation to reflect critically on how to
be.
To conceive the university as an ethical enterprise is to frame the fostering of
this activity—what Newman called “the real cultivation of the mind”— as the
raison d’être of the university. That is not to say that it is either the exclusive
purpose of universities or a purpose exclusive to them. The ends of a
university are as complex and multiple as those of the people who comprise it.
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Moreover, if education represents an enlivening of the human spirit, not a
deadening of the soul, it is irrational to suppose that it should, or even could,
be confined within the institutional boundaries that human beings themselves
transcend. Students pass in and out of university, sometimes attaining
degrees, sometimes not. Some students enter university anticipating
enlightenment only to end up bitterly disappointed; still others enrol for the
specific purpose of getting a degree that will open up employment
opportunities and find themselves enriched in a manner they had never
expected. What some students seek in a chair in the library, others pursue on
a pub stool. Some experience conversations with classmates as far more
fruitful and engaging than listening to the drone of a lecture. Others locate
intellectually fertile ground either alongside or independently from their formal
field of study, organizing charitable fund-raisers, participating in debating
societies, or offering tutoring services. Some may see the act of turning
inward and away from the world as a chance to escape from reality, while
others view it as a way of actually deepening their sense of what is real. Like
any site of human interaction, a university offers opportunities for developing
all manner of human vice and virtue.
An education, as opposed to mere programming, invites students to
recognize, in Barnes’ phrase, “a sacred inner space” in which “being oneself”
may happen. But of course, it is a pyric victory if one can only be oneself, by
oneself. Imagining university as an ethical, as opposed to strictly economic,
enterprise reveals that the end of universities does not lie in the endeavour to
make ends meet. Moreover, to imagine university as an undertaking is to
expose the inadequacy of an enterprise framed “to advance the prestige and
competitiveness of the university as an end in itself” (Marginson & Considine,
p. 5). The ends of university are potentially as plural as the ways in which
human beings seek to invest their lives with meaning. To facilitate the
cultivation of the mind is to foster conditions that make associational life within
universities rewarding.
Imagining university governance interactively
In Robert M. Pirsig’s novel, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, the
character Phadreus works at “what could euphemistically be called a ‘teaching
college’…since you teach and you teach…with no time for research”
(1974/2006, p. 182). In the course on rhetoric in which Phaedrus is trying to
teach his students quality writing, he delivers a lecture that he calls the
“Church of Reason” (p. 183). The title is inspired by a newspaper article he
read in which a local priest was interviewed about some people complaining
that the church building that had been sold off by the diocese was now
operating as a bar. The priest was irritated that those complaining did not
recognize the difference between the Church and the physical building in
which it had once been located. Phaedrus employs this image to illustrate his
idea of the university, which he calls “the real University”. The real University
is not a material object…The real University is a state of mind. It is that great
heritage of rational thought that has been brought down to us through the
centuries and which does not exist at any specific location…The real
University is nothing less than the continuing body of reason itself (p. 185-6).
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According to Phaedrus, that which is called by the same name—the collection
of buildings, the formally recognized legal corporation—is really just “the
location at which conditions have been made favourable” for the real
university to exist (p.187). Grades, degrees, departments, titles, salaries,
tuition—these do not of themselves constitute the “real University”. They may
be part of those conditions that serve to foster the real university’s existence,
but the life of the university is greater than the mere sum of these elements.
Phaedrus’ account locates the soul of the university in teaching, generating
new knowledge and evaluating ideas. He is right that absent these animating
activities, the formal institutional structure of a university is an empty shell. But
such a disembodied account risks relegating inquiry into a completely abstract
realm. Locating the university in the endeavours to discover and share
knowledge offers an antidote to fetishization of a particular institutional form; it
does not, however, inoculate against the implications that any specific choice
of institutional design has for the manner in which those activities are
conceived and carried out (Salamon, 2002: Eliadis et al., 2005).
Undertaking the iterative, complex, and collective challenge of elaborating the
social, political, economic, cultural, and architectural conditions favourable for
the university to exist brings one into the realm of ‘governance’. The term,
‘governance’ signifies something more than simply the one-off or repeated
direction by the governor of the governed. It is the endeavour of establishing
baselines for self-directed human interactions, not the project of micromanaging every single decision that people make (Winston 2001). What is
sometimes perceived as the greatest obstacle to governing—namely, the
possibility of people not doing as they are told— is actually what makes
governance possible. Absent the human capacity to exercise agency, the very
notion of a rule as a normative guide for human conduct would be untenable.
Indeed, there would be no such thing as normativity in a world where people
did not have the ability to recognize it. If people were incapable of basing their
decisions on what they view as authoritative reference points for their
interactions, then behaviour among people would be determined as it is
among a herd of cattle, not by reason-based, inter-subjective communication,
but through contamination by fear. The manner in which the ends of
governance (i.e. policy goals) are selected, and pursued (i.e. policy tools) may
contribute to, or detract from, the degree to which those subject to
governance see themselves as implicated in, and responsible for their
accomplishment. The fulfillment of governance objectives always depends on
participation of the governed.
Sites and modes of governance are plural (Macdonald, 1990; Eliadis et al.,
2005). When it comes to the economy, state governments govern, but so too
do private multinational corporations. When it comes to universities, markets
govern, but so too do university administrations (Jones, Shanahan & Goyan,
2001). At the same time, each university consists not only of a unitary, official
normative structure; it is composed of multiple human associations, exercising
overlapping and conflicting authority over their various members (Macdonald
1990). Within any institution, it is not just “formal instruments and canonical
wisdom…[but] subtle and informal normative orders that make associational
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life possible” (p. 419). On first blush, this would appear to further complicate
the governance endeavour.
However, such limitations to formal institutional authority are necessary
corollaries to its governance potential. The official governing body— defined
by its formal institutional structure— does not have to be a faculty association,
a student union, a designated research group, a specific kind of student club
etc. when these formal or informal institutions are present. At the same time,
however, these and many more human associations serve to mediate how
their members experience life in a university. One’s sense of belonging to
these myriad groups moulds and mirrors one’s normative commitments
(Macdonald, 1996). These sites of interaction play an ineluctable role in how
students and faculty participate—if not explicitly, then implicitly—in the
governance of the university. Every normative institution has implicit and
explicit dimensions (Witteveen & Van der Berg, 1999). It is their interplay that
governs interactions in ways that serve to either further or to undermine
realization of the university’s mission. As incisive as formal, explicit regulation
is, the development of the informal and implicit dimensions of relationships is
vital.
With this in mind, let us consider a question that appears to be at the centre of
the debate over the ‘enterprising university’. How can institutions such as
academic senates and professorial tenure—along with principles such as
academic freedom and academic integrity— be reconciled with the pursuit of
private funding opportunities, the cultivation of corporate partnerships, the
generation of commercial reward, the enhancement of market
competitiveness, and the satisfaction of consumer interests? At issue would
appear to be the notion of a university institution forming relationships with
outside, economic actors. Is a university consequently going to develop an
entrepreneurial identity for itself? I think this inevitable; however, just as it is
possible to identify the sense of meaning one derives through economic
exchange with others, as opposed to the maximization of personal profit, as
the sine qua non of being an entrepreneur, the enterprising activities of a
university may be framed within the broader endeavour of the university. In
neither case, however, does it flow as a matter of course.
Deploying formal instruments and attending to informal normative orders are
vital to avoiding capture by strictly economic interests (Salamon 2002). Thus,
when it comes to governing a private-public partnership, for example, the
most pertinent formal normative instrument is no doubt the contractual
agreement. Terms of a contract lay out a sort of private constitution for the
parties (Fuller, 1970-71, 311). At the same time, the wider legislative context
to which parties are subject serves to establish parameters for negotiation by
providing which provisions will be enforceable before the courts and which will
not. Beyond—and indeed, even through—the negotiation of the formal
agreement, it is the relationship between the parties that is critical. Indeed, as
the eminent contracts law professor, Lon Fuller, once alluded, in some cases,
if the process of working out the contract is performed well enough, then once
it is signed, it can be put away in a drawer and forgotten about. Now that the
parties have been able to communicate and establish their expectations of
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each other, the drafting of the contract has served its purpose (Fuller, 197071, 326-327).
Fulfillment—as opposed to just court-ordered enforcement—of the legal
agreement turns on the parties’ understandings of why they are in a
partnership: what they hope to contribute as well as get out of it, what their
priorities are, and how valuable preservation of their relationship is to them.
Furthermore, the view each party has of the relationship—and therefore the
manner in which they perform the public-private-partnership— depends on
their view of themselves. What are they about? Who are they? What are their
purposes? What, for them, is beyond the pale? Only with a sense of their own
mission—an idea of their own identity, and certain standards about what it
means to keep their integrity— will they know what they want this partnership
to be. As an economic actor, then, it is vital for universities to undergo the
iterative process of articulating to themselves what kind of enterprise they
aspire to be.
In this section I have tried to demonstrate why regaining the ideals
underpinning the vision of university as an independent institution (free from
government, corporate or religious interference) host to the pursuit of
knowledge, discovery and virtue for their own sake (as opposed to their
monetization potential) neither does, nor should, mean re-establishing the
sites and modes of governance associated with the halcyon days of
untrammeled institutional authority. I argue that command-and-control style
governance risks undermining its potential to be an ethical, not merely,
economic undertaking. I write of governance, not management to stress the
facilitation of human agency rather than the exercise of social control.
I argue that the challenge is for those who make up the university to feel a
sense of implication in, and responsibility for, the university’s mission. To feel
implicated in and responsible for the order governing one’s life is crucially
what all governance should be about. The endeavour that is governance
means that by virtue of its collective character, there are going to be
conflicting perspectives on, expectations of, and ideals for what such an order
will entail. Fundamental, then, are: continual recognition of each individual’s
stake in the order to which he or she is subject, plus active cultivation of
conditions to foster each person’s role in making that order what it is, can, and
should be.
Treating these as fundamental means that the processes of working through
disagreement will be designed in ways that militate against marginalization,
alienation, oppression, and denigration of the less powerful. Ultimately, it is
through the actions of those formally being governed, as much as those
officially doing the governing, that the interplay between patent and latent
forms of normativity takes place (Macdonald, 1986). I think the only way the
enterprising university can succeed is if those who constitute it are committed
to a vision of the university as foremost an ethical rather than an economic
enterprise.
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Calling all undertakers: student participation in “the enterprising
university”
In Canada, tuition payments account for the largest percentage of university
funding (Statistics Canada, 2007). Zuo & Ratsoy note that “the financial
restraints facing universities may be leading to a governance structure
characterized by less participation of students, support staff, and faculty
members” (1999, p.20). Nonetheless, they argue that because students
account for the largest proportion of university funding, “students are
demanding more participation” (p.20). If it is by and through the power of the
purse that students develop an outsized influence on faculty decisions
regarding curricular development and teaching methods, buzz words of “the
enterprising university”— such as “creativity, innovation, and collaboration”—
will ring hollow. Economic power, exercised in the marketplace, is a much
blunter instrument than political power exercised through deliberative,
democratic institutions and processes. Consumerism centres on satisfaction
of immediate, individual self-interest—and it is the accumulation of that, which
brings market pressure to bear. What markets do not do, however, is offer
opportunities for expressions of solidarity or the conscious coordination of
goals. The choice of exit that dissatisfied customers have does not represent
a meaningful mode of participation in the process of shaping what the
institution is.
When universities market themselves as business-type enterprises, it is only
natural that students should come to think of themselves as consumers. While
pedagogical relationships continue to have a transformational potential, they
become weighted down by expectation among students that it is—and should
be— purely transactional. The official discourse of the university itself may
champion the very ideas one is trying to dispel or at the very least temper
among students. For students to see themselves as something more than
consumers, they need to have the means to recognize and situate their
concerns within the overall mission of the university. When a university
employs aspirational language to describe its mission, drawing on ideas and
symbols associated with the intellectual and ethical dimensions, it may make it
easier to persuade students the education they have the privilege to receive is
more than a vocational training program designed to get them jobs, to keep
the institution solvent, and to supply the local labour market with workers.
With or without such expressions in the formal documents of the university, it
is incumbent on the community as a whole to flesh out a more robust vision
for their university. At the end of the day, it is not the words on the university’s
website that matter but the actions of those entrusted with working to fulfill its
purpose as a university. Framing the idea of the enterprising university as a
matter of governance rather than management, exposes the importance of reexamining existing structures, processes, rules, and practices within, and
beyond the university, that foster, as opposed to frustrate the agency of
students, professors, sessional lecturers, adjuncts, administrators, staff and
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any other members of the university3. After all, “the best way to ensure the
commitment of stakeholders to the mission of the organisation is to include
them in the process of its formulation” (Menon Eliophotou, 2003, p. 239.) And
yet, it is not just the cheerleaders but also the doomsayers associated with the
enterprising university who oppose the notion of the ‘lunatics running the
asylum’, let alone interfering with its administration. They presume students
are either uninterested or incapable of exercising a constructive decisionmaking role. They worry about disruptions in the administrative balance of
power, and warn of an erosion of academic standards. They take it for granted
that the best students will be concerned about the potentially negative effect
of their involvement on their scholastic performance. Moreover, they fear
those with a narrow political agenda or the winners of popularity contests will
be vaunted into positions of influence where they will surely cause more harm
than good.
The substance of these arguments will be familiar to anyone who has looked
at historical debates over the extension of the franchise. Democratic reform
has very seldom appealed to anyone as strongly as those on the outside of
the official corridors of power looking in. There must be recognition that such
participation is consonant with the fundamental mission of the university itself.
So long as this awareness is missing in the “enterprising university”, there will
not be fertile ground for participative democracy to take root. Moreover, there
must be a corresponding encouragement, opportunity and support to
participate in the governance of these educational institutions. An important
role of university is to provide intellectual resources as well as a social
environment to inform student perspectives, expectations, values and beliefs.
Allocating seats in university senates, on faculty councils and hiring
committees offers a step toward formally contributing to a more meaningful,
deliberative student role in university governance. By itself, such a move may
amount to little more than tokenism.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to trace the role of governance in the
cultivation of university as an ethical enterprise. One only starts to see that
university governance is about more than the mere perfection of managerial
technique when one rejects the assumption that there is a single best way of
doing things, regardless of why one wants to do them. Moreover, the fullness
of any idea of a university may only be appreciated once one is disabused of
the misconception that, once selected, ends may be achieved
unproblematically. I have tried to show why it is important to attend to the
implicit dimensions not just of university governance but of university
education itself. If doing so has been interpreted as a dodge of setting out
explicitly what it means for a university to have integrity or stating canonically
the rules each institution must follow to be an ethical undertaking, so be it.
The question of integrity and the related question of identity are questions that
3

In doing so, I am trying to advance discussion beyond debate over the merits and demerits
of the ‘New Public Management’, which notwithstanding the contemporaneity implied by the
neologism, have been taking place for nearly a quarter-century (Robertson & Verger, 2012;
Hood, 1991; Savoie, 1995; Borins 1995).
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the members of each enterprise, or project through time, must continuously
ask of, and answer for, their university, as they must also do for themselves. I
believe that by explicitly defining the object of university as intellectual, not
moral, Newman was trying to show his audience that the activity of ‘faith
seeking understanding’ would be compromised were religious convictions
allowed to smother intellectual curiosity. That universities, like human beings,
are economic actors is beyond dispute. That some enjoy longer pedigrees,
wider reputations, and deeper pockets than others makes it tempting to call
the facilitation of each individual’s pursuit of virtue through the discovery,
advancement, and dissemination of knowledge, as somehow a luxury, but to
say that is to demean a precious gift.
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